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Abstract
We introduce a reinforcement learning framework for retail robo-advising. The
robo-advisor does not know the investor’s risk preference, but learns it over time
by observing her portfolio choices in different market environments. We develop an
exploration-exploitation algorithm which trades off costly solicitations of portfolio
choices by the investor with autonomous trading decisions based on stale estimates
of investor’s risk aversion. We show that the algorithm’s value function converges to
the optimal value function of an omniscient robo-advisor over a number of periods
that is polynomial in the state and action space. By correcting for the investor’s
mistakes, the robo-advisor may outperform a stand-alone investor, regardless of the
investor’s opportunity cost for making portfolio decisions.
JEL Classification: D14, G02, G11
Keywords: robo-advising, reinforcement learning, portfolio selection, probably approxi-
mately correct-Markov decision processes (PAC-MDP)
1 Introduction
Robo-advisors have emerged prominently as an alternative to traditional human advi-
sors. First introduced as independent start-ups, with Betterment and Wealthfront being
prominent examples, robo-advisors have then been adopted by larger investment com-
panies including, among others, Vanguard and BlackRock. According to Regan (2015),
robo-advisors managed a total asset value of $300 billions by 2016, and they are projected
to reach $2.2 trillions only in the United States by 2020.
Using built-in algorithmic procedures, robo-advisors monitor and re-balance investors’
portfolios in a low cost and efficient manner (Bjerknes and Vukovic (2017)). They save
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on fixed costs, such as salaries of financial advisors and maintenance of physical of-
fices, and by reducing investment requirements to a minimum they can charge lower
fees. They provide transparent and systematic advise, mitigating the bias in the data
gathering and investors’ recommendations process that is typical of human advising
(Foerster et al. (2017)).
The performance of the robo-advisor strongly depends on its ability to accurately
assess the investor’s risk tolerance. Current practices followed by robo-advising firms
to evaluate investors’ risk profiles are based on online questionnaires. Wealthfront, a
pioneer in the robo-advice space, gauges its investors’ risk preferences by asking how
they would react to significant losses implied by a market decline and whether they are
more interested in maximizing gains, minimizing losses or both equally. On the basis
of these answers, as well as other objective metrics (e.g. years to retirement, annual
after-tax income to expense ratio), they construct an investment risk metric. Similar
types of questionnaires are also employed by Schwab Intelligent Portfolios, another major
automated wealth management service.1
The use of questionnaires as a means to accurately elicit risk preferences is appealing,
but also presents shortcomings. Asking an investor how she would react to a significant
loss is unlikely to account for emotional responses, as the latter are only manifested when
the investor actually incurs losses. Holt and Laury (2002) show that investors tend to ex-
hibit more risk tolerance in hypothetical situations as opposed to real ones. Barsky et al.
(1997) assert that survey responses are subject to noise, and hence do not represent an
accurate measure of the investor’s risk profile. In an experiment, Yook and Everett
(2003) assess the risk tolerance of the same investor using six standard questionnaires.
Surprisingly, they find low correlations between the risk tolerance assessment of these
questionnaires, even though they were applied to the same investor.2 These findings
highlight that alternative procedures for risk preference elicitation may be desirable.
We develop a framework in which the robo-advisor learns the investor’s risk pref-
erence from experience, i.e., by observing her portfolio choices under changing market
conditions. In each period, the robo-advisor must place the investor’s capital into one
of several pre-constructed portfolios, each having a distribution of returns that depends
on the prevailing market condition. Each portfolio decision reflects the robo-advisor’s
belief on that specific investor’s risk preferences. The robo-advisor can update its assess-
ment by asking the investor to make the portfolio selection herself. Soliciting portfolio
choices, however, presents an opportunity cost to the investor who needs to devote
time to perform market research or seek more expert advice. This leads to an explo-
ration/exploitation tradeoff : The robo-advisor must decide between making investments
decisions based on its current estimate of the investor’s risk preference or soliciting a
costly action from the investor that can improve its risk preference assessment.
1We refer to Lam (2016) for additional details on the risk-assessment procedure used by robo-advisor
firms as well as the form of interaction with investors to elicit preferences.
2The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) issued a consultation paper, in which they propose
minimum standard requirements for the regulation of robo-advisor services (MAS (2017)). Those re-
quirements include being able to resolve inconsistent responses from the investor by asking additional
questions or contacting her to obtain clarifications on her responses.
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We propose a planning algorithm, and show that it converges to the (intractable)
optimal investment policy in a “small”, i.e., polynomial in the quantities describing the
system, number of steps. Our convergence analysis is inspired from the PAC-MDP
(Probably Approximately Correct in Markov Decision Processes) approach.3 By taking
advantage of structural properties of our robo-advising framework, we show that tighter
bounds, relative to those implied by existing PAC-MDP algorithms, on the number of
convergence steps can be achieved. Specifically, we exploit the key property that our
investor is “small” relative to the market she trades in, and thus investment decisions
executed by the robo-advisor on her behalf do not affect future market conditions.
We demonstrate that the convergence rate to the optimal policy depends on the con-
sistency of the investor’s portfolio choices. The robo-advisor takes longer to learn the
risk preference of an investor who commits many mistakes when selecting her portfolio
(e.g. unsure of her own risk preference, lacking composure, and subject to variations
in emotions) as opposed to an investor who acts more consistently with her risk prefer-
ences (e.g. more self-confident on her risk-tolerance, disciplined, and with low emotional
variations). We calibrate our model to business cycle data from the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) and Vanguard’s economic and market outlook reports.4
Our calibration shows that the robo-advising system achieves a higher value of the in-
vestment criterion than that of an investor-only model, in which the investor directly
chooses the portfolio at a cost. The avoidance of these opportunity costs is one of the
major advantages of robo-advising, which allows the investor to delegate time-consuming
activities to the algorithm and considerably reduce these costs. A second important ad-
vantage of the robo-advising system is its ability to correct for the investor’s mistakes.
Our analysis shows that even if the portfolio choices were costless to the investor, she
would still be outperformed by a robo-advisor with limited initial knowledge on the
investor’s risk preference.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 relates our paper to existing literature.
Section 3 formally describes the model. Section 4 presents the learning algorithm and
provides worst-case theoretical guarantees. Section 5 analyzes the learning speed of the
investor’s risk preferences and the value of the robo-advising system for a calibrated
version of our model. Section 6 concludes the paper. Technical proofs and additional
supporting material are delegated to the Appendix.
2 Literature Review
Our work contributes to the so far scarce literature on robo-advising. D’Acunto et al.
(2019) empirically investigate the implications of a robo-advising platform on perfor-
mance and trading behavior of an investor. In their framework, the robo-advisor selects
an optimal portfolio for each investor, and the investor has the option to accept or
3See Strehl et al. (2009) for a survey on PAC-MDP algorithms and their corresponding complexity
bounds.
4Vanguard currently holds the largest robo-advisor in the world, with $112 billions assets under
management.
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override this decision. They find that the adoption of robo-advising increases portfolio
diversification and reduces well-known behavioral biases, such as the disposition effect,
trend chasing, and the rank effect. Das et al. (2018) develop a framework for goals-based
wealth management.5 They constrain the set of admissible portfolios to those that lie on
the Markowitz’s efficient frontier, and allow the investor to specify her goal in terms of
desired probabilities of achieving the goal. Using geometric arguments, they show that
the simultaneous achievement of all specified goals pin down the desired portfolio on the
efficient frontier. Unlike these studies, our work views the robo-advisor as an algorithm
that provides systematic advice, and calibrates itself to the risk profile of the investor it
serves. Specifically, our approach elicits information about the investor by offering her
a discrete catalogue of portfolios, that may be viewed as lying on the efficient frontier.
Our work is closely related to the stream of literature on inverse reinforcement learn-
ing (IRL) (Russell (1998), Ng and Russell (2000), Abbeel and Ng (2004)), which aims at
learning an agent’s reward function by observing her behavior. These studies typically
assume that demonstration trajectories are exogenously specified, or that inquiring for
an agent’s action is costless (see Arora and Doshi (2018) for a recent survey). As in the
IRL literature, the goal of our robo-advisor is to learn the investor’s risk preference and
hence her reward function. Unlike studies in IRL, in our framework the robo-advisor en-
dogenously determines the amount of information to elicit from the investor so to strike a
balance between the opportunity cost faced by the investor and the suboptimality of de-
cisions based on stale information. This is highly relevant in retail robo-advising, where
soliciting an action from the investor requires close monitoring of financial markets and
hence presents an opportunity cost.
Our work is also related to studies that utilize reinforcement learning to maxi-
mize an investor’s risk-adjusted returns. In a multi-arm bandit setting, Sani et al.
(2012) study the problem of finding the arm that provides the best risk-return trade-
off by using variance as a measure of risk. They propose two algorithms to solve this
mean–variance bandit problem and provide theoretical bounds on regret. In a similar
setting, Vakili and Zhao (2016) provide algorithms that guarantee tighter bounds on
regret than the ones in Sani et al. (2012). In these studies, the risk-aversion parameter
of the investor is assumed to be known while the market model is not. Specifically,
the mean and variance of returns for each portfolio is unknown, and the objective is to
maximize rewards, given a pre-specified investor’s risk preference. By contrast, in our
framework the robo-advisor is unsure about the investor’s risk preference, but has no
uncertainty about the market model.
We conclude by mentioning that, in addition to helping investors to design and
execute investment portfolios in accordance with their risk appetite, robo-advisors also
offer other types of wealth management services. One of the most important services
provided is automated tax management. The early work of Constantinides (1984) finds
5The goals-based investment strategy is also followed by Betterment, one of the leading robo-advisor
firms with $14 billions assets under management. Betterment accounts for the investor’s time horizon
and attributes like age, retirement time, annual income, and investment goals. However, it does not
account for an investor’s subjective risk tolerance in the portfolio selection procedure, and employs
mean–variance optimization to construct efficient portfolios.
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that, in the presence of taxes, the optimal stock trading strategy is to realize capital
losses immediately and defer capital gains for as long as possible. Such a strategy
lies at the heart of loss-harvesting, as described by Stein and Narasimhan (1999). The
laborious work of tax-loss harvesting requires continuous monitoring, which is ideally
suited for robo-advisors that significantly cut down the time and labor costs for these
activities. Hence, robo-advisors increase the number of opportunities to successfully
harvest a tax-loss, relative to traditional investment managers (Traff (2016)).
3 Model
We consider an investment horizon consisting of T periods. There exists a set of m
pre-specified investment portfolios. The investment decisions are delegated to a robo-
advisor, which learns the investor’s risk preference over time, and at each time selects
the portfolio whose returns distribution best reflect the learned preferences. Throughout
the paper, we use I to denote the investor, and R to denote the robo-advisor.
3.1 System States
The system states model the market environment, assumed to be represented by the dis-
tribution of portfolio returns in each state of the market. Formally, S = {s(1), . . . , s(n)}
is the set of economic scenarios. We use Xs,p(i) to denote the random return of portfolio
i, denoted by p(i), in state s ∈ S. For example, s = s(1) may correspond to a bearish
market environment characterized by low return and volatility, while s = s(n) may in-
dicate a bullish market scenario characterized by high returns and high volatility. Note
that the distribution of returns for each portfolio is time invariant, i.e., it depends only
on the prevailing economic state at time s, but not on time t directly. The probability
of a transition from state s to state s′ is assumed to be independent of the investment
decision, and is denoted by P(s′ | s) for all s, s′ ∈ S. This means that the portfolio choice
does not influence the market environment. We denote by st the prevailing economic
state at time t.
3.2 Robo-advisor Action Set
We denote the set of actions available for R by AR = {ask} ∪ {p(1), . . . , p(m)}. An
action aRt = ask corresponds to asking the investor to make a portfolio decision and
aRt = p
(i) ∈ AR corresponds to R choosing portfolio i at time t. If solicited, the investor
chooses an action from the set AI = {p(1), . . . , p(m)} where aIt = p
(i) means that the
investor selects portfolio i at t. If not solicited, the investor does nothing, which we
denote by aIt = {null}. Active intervention by the investor is costly. We assume such
a cost to be constant and denote it by κ > 0. This cost reflects the effort applied by
the investor to choose a portfolio, including close monitoring of financial markets and
solving her own optimization problem. The attention span required to make investment
decisions on short time-scales needs to be taken out from other activities, and thus
presents an opportunity cost to the investor.
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3.3 Investor’s Behavior and Optimization Criterion
Empirical evidence (see, for instance, Rachleff (2014) and Bucciol and Miniaci (2018))
suggests that investors’ risk preferences are positively correlated to market performance.
These claims are further supported by Betterment, as its clients tend to increase their
portfolio risk following periods of strong market performance (Swift (2015)). To capture
these empirical patterns, we make the investor’s risk preference depend on the prevailing
market environment. Specifically, in each state s, the investor’s risk-aversion is quantified
by the parameter θs, which belongs to a finite set Θ. We denote the profile of the
investor’s risk aversion across all states by θ := (θs(1) , . . . , θs(n)). We assume that the
machine does not know the value of θ at the beginning of the investment period.
At time t, we denote the investor’s utility function by u(θst , st, at), where we recall
that st is the market state at t, θst is investor’s risk aversion in that state, and at is the
portfolio chosen at t. At any given point in time, an investor may not act consistently
with her risk preferences. We employ the following model for the investor’s behavior:
Investor’s Choice Model: At any time t, the investor acts according to the risk pref-
erence θ˜t ∼ Bst where Bst is a probability distribution on Θ with a mean of θst.
This model assumes that although the investor commits mistakes when making decisions,
she is on average correct, i.e., acts according to her true risk preferences on average. This
is consistent with empirical evidence (Schildberg-Hörisch (2018)), which suggests that
lack of discipline, stress, and temporary emotions cause variation in risk preferences
around the average level. The robo-advisor does not know the distribution Bst used
by the investor to draw decisions, but knows the support of the distribution and the
variance of mistakes in each state. It also knows that the investor will act according to
her true risk preference on average.6
The objective of the robo-advisor is to maximize the investor’s utility when it does
not know the investor’s risk preference a priori, but learns it over time by observing
her portfolio choices. The robo-advisor faces a tradeoff between soliciting costly actions
from the investor that allow for portfolio choices more tailored to the investor’s risk
aversion, and acting based on stale estimates of her risk aversion. Specifically, if the
current economic state is st and the investor is solicited, she selects a portfolio that
is optimal according to her current utility function characterized by the risk aversion
parameter θ˜t. This means that the investor chooses a
I
t = g(θ˜t, st) where
g(θ˜t, st) := argmax
a∈AI
u(θ˜t, st, a).
Assumption 3.1. The optimal portfolio function g(·, st) is invertible.
Assumption 3.1 implies that, by observing the investor’s action aIt , the robo-advisor can
infer the corresponding risk aversion parameter θ˜t. Consider, for example, a portfolio
6The analysis presented in this paper can be easily generalized to the case where the investor is not
correct on average, i.e., she consistently overestimates or underestimates her risk preference.
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selection procedure in which a share w of wealth is invested in the risky asset and the
remaining share (1−w) in the risk-free asset. For example, Betterment allows its clients
to choose any portfolio along the efficient frontier, by asking them to select their desired
combination of stocks and treasury securities (Holeman (2018)). A sufficient condition
for Assumption 3.1 to be satisfied is that the investor’s share w of the risky asset be
strictly monotone in her risk aversion parameter θs; a relation we expect to hold in
practice since the higher the investor’s risk aversion, the lower the amount she will
invest in the risky asset.
Observe that even though the robo-advisor can imply a risk aversion parameter
from the investor’s portfolio selection, there is no guarantee that this reflects the true
investor’s risk aversion. The investor acts consistently with her risk preferences only on
average, and her mistakes prevent the robo-advisor from learning the actual risk aversion
parameter in each market state from a single observation of the investor’s choice in that
state.
Next, we discuss an important family of utility models, known as mean-risk. The
mean-risk approach, first introduced by Markowitz (1952), postulates an objective func-
tion of the form
u(θst , st, at) = E[Xst,at ]− θstD[Xst,at ], (1)
where E denotes the expectation operator, and D is measure of dispersion capturing the
uncertainty of portfolio returns. Hence, the above criterion trades off expected returns
with the amount of undertaken risk, and the risk-aversion coefficient θst determines the
balance. The larger θst, the more the investor penalizes risky portfolio choices. Risk
functionals typically used in applications include:
• Mean-variance, which is obtained by setting
D[Xst,at ] := V ar[Xst,at ]. (2)
This model is the most popular asset allocation framework employed by robo-
advising firms. For example, Wealthfront uses mean-variance optimization in its
purest form, and Schwab complements mean-variance analysis with full-scale opti-
mization (Lam (2016)).7
• Central semideviations, obtained by choosing
D[Xst,at ] :=
(
E
[
(E[Xst,at ]−Xst,at)
p
+
])1/p
,
where p ∈ [1,∞) is a fixed parameter and (x)+ := max(x, 0). Unlike mean-variance,
which weights equally upward and downward deviations from the mean, this mea-
sure only penalizes downward deviations of Xst,at from the mean.
7Full-scale optimization considers all features of the return distribution, including skewness and kur-
tosis. In Schwab’s full-scale optimization, the disutility from losses is weighted twice as large as the
utility of an equal-sized gain. The reader is referred to Adler and Kritzman (2007) for a more detailed
comparison of mean-variance and full-scale optimization.
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• Weighted mean deviations from quantiles, which is obtained by choosing
D[Xst,at ] := E
[
max{(1− α)(H−1Xst,at
(α)−Xst,at), α(Xst ,at −H
−1
Xst,at
(α))}
]
,
where α ∈ (0, 1) is a fixed parameter and H−1Xst,at
(·) is the left-size α-quantile of
the HXst,at (x) = P(Xst,at ≤ x), that is, H
−1
Xst,at
(α) := inf{x : Hz(x) ≥ α}. Unlike
the previous two models, which penalize deviations from the average, this criterion
measures the tails on the far left of returns captured by the quantile parameter α.8
The above discussed models differ in the distributional content needed for their imple-
mentation. The mean-variance is the least demanding, just requiring mean and variance
of returns, while the weighted mean deviations from quantiles is the most demanding,
requiring the full distribution of returns Xs,a for each state s and action a.
3.4 Robo-Advisor Policy
Denote the set of public histories by
Ht :=
t⋃
k=1
(
AI ×AR
)k−1
× Sk,
where ht =
(
s1, a
I
1, a
R
1 , . . . , a
I
t−1, a
R
t−1, st
)
∈ Ht for t > 1 and h1 = s1. A public his-
tory contains information that is observed by both the investor and the robo-advisor.
This includes the realization of the system’s states and the actions executed by both
agents. At each time t, the robo-advisor chooses an action aRt = πt(Ht), where the
policy πt is adapted to the history Ht. It is crucial that the robo-advisor’s policy de-
pends on the whole history, because prior states and actions convey information to the
robo-advisor about the investor’s risk preference. Our framework is closely related to
inverse reinforcement learning, where the agent aims to estimate the reward function
from previous expert demonstrations (see Definition 2 in Arora and Doshi (2018)). We
collect the sequence of policies adopted by the robo-advisor from period 1 through T in
the vector π = (π1, . . . , πT ).
At any time t, the investor’s reward when the robo-advisor takes action aRt is given
by
r(st, a
R
t , θst) =
{
u(θst, st, a
I
t)− κ, if a
R
t = ask,
u(θst, st, a
R
t ), otherwise,
8The mean-deviation from quantiles model is closely related to Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Conditional
Value-at-Risk (CVaR). Denote by qα, V aRα, and CV aRα the mean-deviation, VAR, and CVaR at the
α quantile. Then, the following identity holds
CV aRα(X) =
1
α
∫ 1
1−α
V aR1−τ (X)dτ = E[X] +
1
α
q1−α[Z].
We refer to Shapiro et al. (2009) for the details.
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where we recall that κ is the intervention cost incurred by the investor. If θ = {θs}s∈S
is known to the robo-advisor, we can find the optimal value function V ∗ by solving the
Bellman’s optimality equation
V ∗τ (s, θ) = maxa
r(s, a, θs) +
∑
s′
P(s′|s)V ∗τ−1(s
′, θ),
where τ is the number of remaining periods. The robo-advisor cannot achieve an optimal
reward because the investor’s risk preference vector θ is not known a priori. The robo-
advisor’s objective is to find the policy that maximizes the investor’s cumulative reward,
i.e.,
π∗ = argmax
π
E
(
T∑
t=1
r(st, a
R
t , θst)
)
, (3)
where aRt = π(Ht) and the expectation is taken with respect to the probability distri-
bution of the state trajectory (s1, s2, . . . , sT ).
9 We remark here that maximizing (3)
is a notoriously difficult task, and is tractable only in few highly specialized cases.10
Therefore, we consider the relaxed goal of acting near-optimally on all but a polynomial
number of steps. More formally, if Pt is the policy followed by the algorithm at time t,
let V Ptτ (ht, θ) := E
(∑t+τ−1
j=t r(sj, a
R
j , θsj )|ht
)
where aRj = Pj(hj).
11 We require that
with a probability greater than 1− δ,
V Ptτ (ht, θ) ≥ V
∗
τ (st, θ)− ǫ
for all but m = O(poly(|S|, τ, 1/ǫ, 1/δ)) time steps. This performance measure guaran-
tees that with a high probability, a near-optimal solution is attained in a “small” (i.e.,
polynomial) number of steps. Note that in a finite number of steps, no algorithm can
identify the optimal policy with probability one. First, there is no guarantee that all
market states will be visited in a finite number of steps. Second, even if all states were
to be reached, the algorithm is still unable to infer the true investor’s risk preference due
to investor’s mistakes in her portfolio choices. Thus, a failure probability of at most δ is
allowed. We refer to Kakade (2003) for a more detailed description of this performance
measure and its uses.
9We assume that T is finite and the discount factor is γ = 1 to simplify exposition. All results easily
extend to the case where T =∞ and γ < 1 (see Appendix C for the details).
10The k-armed bandit problem is one notable exception. In this problem, the well-known Gittins
indices may be used to solve for the optimal policy in a Bayesian setting. We refer to Gittins et al.
(2011) for further details.
11The value function V ∗τ (s, θ) achieved by an omniscient robo-advisor, which knows the investor’s risk
preference θ in advance, only depends on the current state st. This due to Markov property and the fact
that an omniscient robo-advisor does need to keep track of the investor’s previous actions to infer her
risk preference. However, st is replaced with ht in the value function V
Pt
τ (ht, θ) since the robo-advisor
in our framework typically does not know investor’s risk preference θ in advance and needs to estimate
it from her previous actions (i.e., the policy Pt is non-stationary).
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4 Near-Optimal Rewards
In this section, we propose an algorithm that achieves near optimal rewards in a small,
i.e., polynomial in various quantities describing the system, number of steps with a high
probability. The speed of learning depends on the consistency of investor’s decisions,
quantified by the variance of the distribution of mistakes, denoted by σ2s , and range of
its support, denoted by Rs. It also depends on the required estimation accuracy of the
risk aversion parameter. Both σ2s and Rs are formally defined in Section 4.2.
4.1 Algorithm
Denote by aIn,s the n-th action executed by the investor in state s. Denote by θˆ
(n)
s the
estimate of the investor’s risk-aversion parameter in state s after she has been observed
acting n times in that state. This is computed as
θˆ(n)s :=
g−1(aI1,s; s) + g
−1(aI2,s; s) + · · · + g
−1(aIn,s; s)
n
. (4)
This average estimator may be computed incrementally. Given the current estimate θˆ
(n−1)
s
and after observing the nth investor’s action aIn,s, the revised estimate of the risk-aversion
parameter θˆ
(n)
s is, for n ≥ 2,
θˆ(n)s =
1
n
n∑
i=1
g−1(aIi,s; s)
= θˆ(n−1)s +
1
n
(
g−1(aIn,s; s)− θˆ
(n−1)
s
)
.
This iterative formula (see Appendix B for the detailed derivation) holds even when n =
1, yielding θˆ
(1)
s = g−1(aI1; s) for any θˆ
(0)
s .12
Algorithm 1. Input C(s) for all s ∈ S. Set N(s) = 0 and θˆs = 0 for all s ∈ S. Let s1
be prevailing economic state at time 1. For t = 1, 2, . . . , T :
1. If N(st) < C(s), set a
R
t := ask and N(st) = N(st) + 1. Observe the investor’s
action aIt , and update as θˆst = θˆst +
g−1(aIt;st)−θˆst
N(st)
.
2. Otherwise, set aRt := argmaxa r(st, a, θ¯) where θ¯ = argminx∈Θ |x− θˆst |.
Algorithm 1 takes as input a sample complexity parameter C(s), which indicates
the number of solicitations the robo-advisor makes to the investor in state s before it
12A naive, yet conceptually easier, implementation of (4) would keep track of investor’s actions, across
all states, and then re-compute this average from scratch whenever the risk aversion parameter estimate is
needed. However, the computational and memory requirements would grow over time as more investor’s
actions are solicited, an important concern for robo-advisors which are designed to serve a large number
of clients concurrently.
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starts investing autonomously. We say that the investor’s risk preference in state s is
accurately estimated if C(s) solicitations have been made. Intuitively, an accurate
risk preference estimate θˆs requires a large value of C(s). We provide a formal analysis
of how to pick C(s) to guarantee convergence in Section 4.2.
4.2 Sample Complexity Analysis
Definition 4.1. The sample complexity function, f(s, δ), is the minimum number
of solicitations such that if d ≥ f(s, δ) investor’s actions in state s have been observed,
then θs = argminx∈Θ |x − θˆs| with a probability at least 1 − δ regardless of the true
investor’s risk aversion parameter θs.
The following lemma provides a bound on the performance of the algorithm when
the risk aversion parameter θs is accurately estimated for a subset K of the states. It
shows that the rewards obtained from the algorithm are close to the optimal rewards,
provided that the probability of escaping the subspace K is low.
Lemma 4.1. Let Pt denote the policy followed by Algorithm 1 at time t, st be the
economic state at t, and set C(s) = f
(
s, δ|S|
)
. Let θ be the true risk aversion parameter
of the investor, Kt be the set of states with accurately estimated risk preferences at time t,
and A(Kt, st) be the event that a state not in Kt is visited in the remaining τ steps when
starting from state st ∈ Kt. Then, with probability at least 1− δ,
V Ptτ (ht, θ) ≥ V
∗
τ (st, θ)− 2τrmaxP(A(Kt, st))
where |r(·)| ≤ rmax.
Next, we present our main theoretical result, which gives a performance guarantee
for the algorithm.
Theorem 4.1. Let Pt denote the policy followed by Algorithm 1 at time t, st be the
economic state at t, and set C(s) = f
(
s, δ|S|
)
. Let θ be the true investor type. Then with
probability at least 1− 2δ,
V Ptτ (ht, θ) ≥ V
∗
τ (st, θ)− ǫ
— i.e., the algorithm is ǫ-close to the true optimal policy — for all but
m = O
(
τ2rmax
∑
sC(s)
ǫ
ln
1
δ
)
time steps.
Theorem 4.1 states that, with high probability, our algorithm performs near optimally
for all but a “small” number of time steps — where “small” here means polynomial in
various quantities describing the MDP. We observe that the provided bound is tighter
than standard PAC-MDP bounds. To the best of our knowledge, therein the constant is
m = O˜
(
τ6rmax|S||A|
ǫ2
)
11
time steps, where |A| is the number of actions available in each state.13 This bound is
achieved, for instance, by Kolter and Ng (2009), which consider optimality with respect
to the Bayesian policy for a given belief state, rather than the optimal policy for a
fixed MDP. To achieve this bound, they assume that the prior on the unknown model
parameter follows a Dirichlet distribution. In contrast, we adopt a frequentist approach
which thus does not require the specification of any prior distribution. We are able to
obtain a tighter bound by exploiting a unique feature of our robo-advising framework:
investment decisions do not impact future market conditions. This stands in contrast
with standard PAC-MDP analysis in other application domains, where actions in a given
state typically influence state transitions.
In the remainder of this section, we examine how different distributions of investor
mistakes Bs impact the sample complexity function f(s, δ). Let Θ = {θ
i}1≤i≤|Θ| be the
set of possible risk aversion parameters. Without loss of generality, assume θi+1 > θi for
any θi ∈ Θ and set ξ := min1≤i≤|Θ|−1 θ
i+1 − θi. The following lemma provides an upper
bound on the sample complexity function for each state s.
Lemma 4.2. If the distribution of the investor’s mistakes Bs has variance σ
2
s , then the
sample complexity function f(s, δ) is at most 1 + 4σ
2
s
δξ2 .
The upper bound given in Lemma 4.2 depends on two model parameters: consis-
tency of investor’s decisions (measured by the variance of investor’s mistakes σ2s) and
the resolution of the risk aversion grid (ξ). If the investor’s portfolio decisions are con-
sistent (i.e., low σ2s), then a low sample complexity parameter is required to guarantee
an accurate estimate of the risk aversion parameter. In fact, as evident from Lemma 4.2,
in the limiting case where the investor does not make mistakes (i.e., σs = 0), only one
solicitation is needed to infer her risk aversion parameter in state s. The resolution
parameter ξ controls the required precision of the risk aversion parameter estimate. As
the needed precision grows to infinity (i.e., ξ approaches zero), greater exploration and
learning is necessary. The following lemma provides an alternative bound on the sample
complexity function, which depends on the range of support Rs of the distribution Bs,
as opposed to the variance σ2s .
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Lemma 4.3. If the support of the distribution of investor’s mistakes Bs has a range Rs,
then the sample complexity function f(s, δ) is at most 2Rsξ2 ln
2
δ .
Lemma 4.3 gives qualitative insights similar to Lemma 4.2, except that the consis-
tency of the investor’s decisions is now measured by the range of mistakes rather than
their variance. Note that this bound increases only logarithmically in 1/δ, and thus
becomes tighter than the bound provided in Lemma 4.2 as δ → 0. Because the bounds
given in this section apply to any distribution of mistakes, they are very conservative.
As we show in Section 5, in practice, the sample complexity function is much lower than
the theoretical bounds.
13The O˜(·) notation suppresses logarithmic factors.
14The range of support, Rs, is defined as the difference between the maximum and minimum values
of the support of the distribution Bs. Recall that the support of a distribution is the set of all values
attainable by the random variable.
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5 Calibration
5.1 Calibration Procedure
The calibration procedure picks model parameters that are implied by business cycle
data released by NBER and Vanguard’s economic and market outlook reports. We
choose the mean-variance defined in (2) as the investor’s risk criterion. The robo-advisor
investment decisions are made on a monthly basis. Accordingly, all calibrated parameters
are estimated in monthly units.
• System states: There are three states, representing low, medium, and high re-
turn volatility markets. The average length of the U.S. business cycle during the
period 1945 − 2019 is 70 months.15 Because there are three states and each of
them is visited twice in a business cycle, each state lasts approximately 12 months.
A period of 12 months in a state corresponds to an escape probability of 0.08. Ac-
cordingly, we set the probability that a state stays the same from period t to t+1
to 0.92. If the medium return volatility market is currently prevailing, then with
a probability of 0.04 the state will transition to the high return volatility market
and with a probability of 0.04 the state will transition to the low return volatility
market in the next period. If the low (high) return volatility market is currently
prevailing, then with a probability of 0.08 the state will transition to the medium
return volatility market in the next period.
• Portfolio selection: There is a risky and a risk-free asset. We use the monthly
treasury rate as a proxy for the return of the risk-free asset and set r = 0.2% for the
monthly return.16 The returns and standard deviation of the risky asset depend on
the prevailing market conditions. According to Vanguard’s economic and market
outlook reports, predicted yearly returns for the equity market take values between
6% and 15%.17 Therefore, in the low, medium, and high return volatility market,
we respectively set the monthly returns to 0.5%, 0.875%, and 1.25%. We choose
the monthly standard deviation for the medium return volatility market to be 4%.
This is based on the sequence of historical prices of the S&P 500 in the previous
5 years, starting from July 11th 2014 through July 2nd 2019, which yielded monthly
returns approximately the same as those in the medium return volatility market.
Using the medium-volatility market as a benchmark, we set the monthly standard
deviations of the low and high return volatility market to 3% and 5%, respectively.
Portfolio selection corresponds to choosing a share w of wealth to invest in the
risky asset and (1 − w) in the risk-free asset. Once the weight w is specified by
the investor, the mean and standard deviation of the corresponding portfolio in a
given state s are µ(s,w) = wµs + (1 − w)rs and σ(w) = wσs, respectively, where
15The US business cycle data is obtained from the NBER (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html)
16The monthly treasury rate is as of 05/16/2019. Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury website:
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/.
17Vanguard’s economic and market outlook reports can be found at their news center
website: https://pressroom.vanguard.com/.
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r is the average return of the risk-free asset, µs is the average return of the risky
asset in state s, and σs is the standard deviation of the risky asset in state s. We
assume no short selling is allowed, i.e., 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. This choice is consistent with
current practices of robo-advising firms, which only invests cash from investors,
that is, leveraging and shorting is not allowed. We limit the set of possible weight
choices to {0.0001, 0.0002. . . . , 1} to obtain a discrete set of portfolios.
• Investor behavior: We assume that a typical retail investor allocates at least
20% of her portfolio to stocks. This range covers income-oriented investors (20%-
40% stock share) that seek current income with minimal risk, balanced-oriented
investors (40%-70% stock share) that seek to reduce potential volatility but are
willing to tolerate some risk, and growth-oriented investors (70%-100% stock share)
that aim to maximize returns with little concern on risk taking.18 Accordingly, the
set of possible risk aversion parameters for the retail investor is
Θ = {2.2, 2.3, . . . , 8.2, 8.3}, where the lowest value in the set corresponds to the risk
aversion parameter for which it is optimal to choose a portfolio with 100% shares
in stocks (i.e., w = 1) and the largest value corresponds to the parameter for which
it is optimal to choose a portfolio with 20% shares in stocks (i.e., w = 0.2). The
set Θ includes risk aversion parameters of the same magnitude as those estimated
empirically in Bucciol and Miniaci (2011).19 Note that the resolution parameter
in this setup is ξ = 0.1. In Appendix D, we show that using a finer grid to define
the investor’s risk preference does not increase much the rewards from investment
decisions. If θst is the investor’s true risk preference in state st, she will act as
θ˜t = random.sample({θst − r, . . . , θst, . . . , θst + r}), (5)
where r bounds the size of mistakes and random.sample(·) is a function that sam-
ples uniformly at random from the input set.20 The function random.sample(·) is
the maximum entropy probability distribution for a given support (i.e., it assumes
the least amount of information on θ), and hence the numerical results in this
section provide a conservative assessment of the learning speed. For the baseline
case, we set r = 3. We test the sensitivity of our results to different values of r in
Section 5.2.
• Opportunity cost: Keyes (2019) reports that as of January 2019, Betterment
manages $15 billion in assets for its 400,000 customers. Based on this, we estimate
the average investment in robo-advising firms to be $37,500. Moreover, the U.S.
Census Bureau reports that the median household income in the U.S. is $61,372.21
18Vanguard: https://personal.vanguard.com/.
19Bucciol and Miniaci (2011) quantify risk using a risk tolerance parameter, which is just the reciprocal
of our risk-aversion parameter θ.
20If some of the elements in the set {θst − r, . . . , θst , . . . , θst + r} do not belong to Θ, we truncate the
distribution of mistakes at the edges to ensure that all elements in the set belong to Θ while preserving
the “correct on-average” requirement E(θ˜t) = θst .
21This is based on the latest income report issued by the U.S. Census Bureau,
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This yearly salary corresponds to an hourly rate of $29.51. If we assume that the
average investor spends 1 hour per month in researching and deciding on portfolios,
then the opportunity cost is precisely this hourly rate. However, because returns
are measured relative to the total invested amount, this opportunity cost must
also be measured relative to such an amount. Therefore, dividing the hourly rate
by the average investment amount, we obtain an opportunity cost κ = 0.08%.
Observe that this value is based on the assumption that each investor spends only
1 hour per month making investment decisions, and hence is rather conservative.
In Section 5.2, we demonstrate that the value added by robo-advising increases
as κ increases.
5.2 Calibration Results
This section presents the result of our calibrated model. We investigate the rate at which
the machine learns the investor’s risk preferences, and the value of the robo-advisor. We
assess the performance of our algorithm using Monte-Carlo simulations. In every run, the
investor’s risk-aversion parameter θs in each state s is sampled uniformly at random from
the set Θ. We measure the value added by the robo-advisor by comparing its investment
performance to that of an investor-only model in which the investor makes decisions
in isolation. In the investor-only model, the investor needs to choose her own portfolio
every month and incur the cost κ for doing so. We also compare the performance of
the robo-advisor algorithm with that of an omniscient robo-advisor, which knows the
investor’s risk preference θ in advance. The omniscient robo-advisor model provides an
upper bound for achievable rewards.
Throughout the section, we set the sample complexity function to be equal across
states, and we denote it simply by C. Figure 1 shows the average yearly reward versus
time for the omniscient robo-advisor, robo-advisor, and investor-only models. It shows
that the yearly rewards achieved by the robo-advisor model become very close to those
attainable by an omniscient robo-advisor within a period of two years. Therefore, as
suggested by our theoretical results, the proposed algorithm converges fast to the optimal
policy. It is worth noting that the sample complexity parameter is set to C = 5, hence
much lower than what is required by Theorem 4.1. This is explained by the fact that our
theoretical result considers worst-case bounds, and hence the sample complexity of the
exploration bounds, such as those in Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3, may be overly conservative in
practice.
In Figure 2, we assess the performance of the robo-advisor algorithm using different
sample complexity parameters. The choice of sample complexity governs the trade-off be-
tween shorter-term reduced payoff and longer-term learning benefits. When the sample
complexity parameter is low, more exploitation is performed at the expenses of learn-
ing, which increases short-term rewards but prevents the robo-advisor from accurately
learning the true risk preference of the investor. As the sample complexity parame-
which was for the year 2017. The full report can be found in their website:
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2018/demo/p60-263.html.
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Figure 1: Yearly reward versus time, averaged over 104 trials and shown with 95%
confidence. The bound on the size of mistakes is r = 3, the sample complexity is C =
5, the opportunity cost is κ = 0.08%, and the total learning period is 10 years (i.e.,
120 months). The yearly performance of the robo-advisor model becomes close to the
maximum achievable rewards obtained by an omniscient robo-advisor within a period
of two years. The value added by the robo-advisor is evident from the noticeable large
gap in its achieved yearly rewards relative to those of the investor-only model.
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Figure 2: Yearly reward versus time, averaged over 104 trials. The bound on the size of
mistakes is r = 3, the opportunity cost is κ = 0.08%, and the total learning period is 10
years (i.e., 120 months). The trade-off between exploration and exploitation is captured
by the sample complexity parameter C. Increasing the sample complexity C reduces the
short-term rewards but provides longer-term learning benefits.
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Figure 3: Yearly reward versus time, averaged over 104 trials. The sample complexity
is C = 5, the opportunity cost is κ = 0.08%, and the total learning period is 10 years
(i.e., 120 months). The performance of the robo-advisor improves as the investor provides
more consistent investment decisions (i.e., the size of mistakes is low). Even if the investor
makes large mistakes in the robo-advisor model, the yearly performance exceeds that of
the investor-only model with no mistakes.
ter increases, short-term rewards are sacrificed to improve learning, providing a better
performance in the longer term.
The speed of learning is also impacted by the size of mistakes r, as defined in (5).
Consistently with Lemma 4.3, Figure 3 highlights that mistakes slow down the learning
process. However, even if the size of the investor’s mistakes is large, the robo-advisor
model still outperforms the investor-only model even in the hypothetical case where the
investor makes no mistakes when she acts independently. This is because the investor
does not incur the opportunity cost κ if the portfolio is chosen by the robo-advisor.
By contrast, this cost is incurred every period in the investor-only system. From an
operational perspective, this is one of the primary advantages of robo-advising, in that
it allows the investor to delegate research on investment instruments, times for portfolio
re-balancing, and other time-consuming activities to the robo-advisor.
We observe from Figure 4 that the robo-advisor model yields a higher average cumu-
lative reward over the investment horizon, when compared to the investor-only model.
This difference is partly explained by the aforementioned delegation process, which re-
duces the investor’s costs due to the automation of investment decisions. A second
contributing factor is that the investor makes mistakes when performing investment de-
cisions. The robo-advisor, instead, makes portfolio choices that are optimal given her
current view of the investor, even if it is limited by the amount of available information
on the investor. The left-most bar charts of the figure highlight precisely this effect: the
robo-advisor with imperfect knowledge of the investor’s risk parameter still outperforms
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Figure 4: Expected total reward of the omniscient robo-advisor model (red), the robo-
advisor model (green), and the investor-only model (blue), as a function of the opportu-
nity cost κ. The total reward is over a period of 5 years, averaged over 104 trials. The
bound on the size of mistakes is r = 3 and the sample complexity is C = 5. The higher
is the opportunity cost κ, the higher the value of the robo-advisor relative the investor.
a stand-alone investor who incurs zero costs for making investment decisions herself but
makes mistakes and is only correct on average.
6 Concluding Remarks and Future Developments
Robo-advising can substantially enhance human efficiency in investment decisions by
handling time-intensive operations. It is crucial, however, that the investor is able to
efficiently communicate her preferences to the machine to optimize her objective function.
The robo-advisor can only provide a useful service if its valuation of the benefits and
risks associated with each action are aligned with the preferences of the investor that it
serves.
We have provided a framework that allows the investor to directly make portfolio
choices, and proposed an algorithm through which a robo-advisor can quantify and
assess the investor’s subjective risk tolerance from her portfolio choices. The provided
algorithm allows the robo-advisor to be ǫ-close to the (intractable) optimal policy with
high probability after a polynomial number of steps. Our analysis leverages upon existing
results from the PAC-MDP literature, and exploits the structure of the robo-advising
problem to obtain sharper bounds than those attained in standard PAC-MDP problems.
We have shown that the speed of learning depends on two key properties: consistency
of investor’s decisions and the required precision of the risk-aversion estimate. We have
analyzed the efficiency of the algorithm and the value added by the robo-advisor over
the stand-alone investor.
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In this paper, we have considered a mean-risk approach for portfolio selection where
the investor chooses from a pre-specified set of portfolios that lie along the efficient
frontier. An extension of the model would allow the investor to personalize these port-
folios based on her personal views. For example, one can employ the Black-Litterman
model (Black and Litterman (1990)) to embed the investor’s subjective views into the
mean-variance Markowitz optimization framework.
Our analysis provides a first step towards quantifying the efficiency of learning in the
context of risk-preferences estimation. The objective function maximized by the robo-
advisor favors the construction of algorithms that try to achieve optimality as quickly
as possible, with little regard to the costs incurred during the learning period. This is
acceptable in a setting with long investment horizon, such as planning for retirement. If
the investment horizon is short, it may instead be desirable to design a less aggressive
learning algorithm, i.e., that takes longer to achieve optimality but gains higher total
rewards during the learning process. A suitable performance measure would be the
expected decrease in rewards when following the algorithm versus behaving optimally
since the beginning.22 We leave such an extension for future research.
We believe that our framework can be specialized to deal with a larger class of
autonomous systems, including those for logistic operations, digital assistance, defense,
robotics, and self-driving taxi systems. As an illustrative example, consider the following
practical application of our framework. Assume that a network of self-driving taxis tracks
each time a user hails a ride. As a part of the service, the rider is able to select one of the
several routes or destinations that match a search query; for example, to local restaurants
or retail stores. Our framework can generate an assessment of each user’s preferences
towards various destinations and on the rider’s sensitivity towards the risks involved in
travel, such as the uncertainty of the arrival time to each destination. This assessment
enables the taxicab to provide better service to the rider, by presenting options that are
customized for the user on the next ride.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4.1. For a fixed partial path hL = (s1, a
R
1 , a
I
1, . . . , a
I
j−1, a
R
j−1, sj) with
t < j ≤ t+ τ − 1, let P(ht:j) be the probability that the state trajectory (st+1, . . . , sj) is
realized after time t. Let Hj be the set of all partial paths hj such that all states (si)t<i≤j
in that path belong to Kt (i.e., only states with an accurately estimated risk preference
are reached). Let rπθ (j) be the (random) reward received by a type θ investor at time j
given that the robo-advisor policy is π, and rπθ (hj , j) the reward at time j given that hj
is the realized partial path. We denote by π∗ the optimal policy and by Pj the policy
followed by Algorithm 1 at time j. Then, the following holds:
E{rπ
∗
θ (j)} − E{r
Pj
θ (j)} =
∑
hj∈Hj
P(ht:j)
(
rπ
∗
θ (hj , j)− r
Pj
θ (hj , j)
)
+
∑
hj 6∈Hj
P(ht:j)
(
rπ
∗
θ (hj , j) − r
Pj
θ (hj , j)
)
=
∑
hj 6∈Hj
P(ht:j)
(
rπ
∗
θ (hj , j)− r
Pj
θ (hj , j)
)
≤ 2rmax
∑
hj 6∈Hj
P(ht:j)
≤ 2rmaxP(A(Kt, st))
with a probability at least 1 − δ. The first step in the above derivation separates
the possible paths in which only states with an accurately estimated risk preference
are reached from those in which the robo-advisor encounters a state with an investor
risk preference that is not accurately estimated. The first sum equals zero because Pj
acts optimally on states with an accurately estimated risk preference with a proba-
bility greater than 1 − |Kt|
δ
|S| by the union bound. Note that this probability is at
least 1− δ since |S| ≥ |Kt|. The final inequality makes use of the facts that rewards are
bounded |rθ| ≤ rmax and the sum of probabilities that a partial path includes s 6∈ K is
bounded above by P(A(Kt, st)). The result then follows since V
∗
τ (st, θ) − V
Pt
τ (ht, θ) =∑t+τ−1
j=t E{r
π∗
θ (j)} − E{r
Pj
θ (j)}.
Before proceeding to the proof of Theorem 4.1, we recall the following well-known
result, also known as the Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound.
Lemma A.1. Suppose a weighted coin, when flipped, has a probability p > 0 of landing
with heads up. Then, for any positive integer k and real number δ, there exists m =
O
(
k
p ln
1
δ
)
, such that after m tosses, with probability at least 1− δ we will observe k or
more heads.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.1.
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Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let Kt be the set of states with accurately estimated risk pref-
erences at time t. First, suppose that P(A(Kt, st)) ≤
ǫ
2τrmax
. By Lemma 4.1, with
probability at least 1− δ, we have
V Ptτ (ht, θ) ≥ V
∗
τ (st, θ)− 2τrmaxP(A(Kt, st)) ≥ V
∗
τ (st, θ)− ǫ.
Now suppose that P(A(Kt, st)) >
ǫ
2τrmax
, which implies that the robo-advisor follow-
ing Pt will either follow the optimal policy for the remaining τ time steps, or en-
counter s 6∈ Kt with probability at least
ǫ
2τrmax
. We call the event that the robo-advisor
encounters s 6∈ Kt a “success”. Then, by Lemma A.1, after O((τ
2ζrmax/ǫ) ln(1/δ)) time
steps, where P(A(Kt, st)) >
ǫ
2τrmax
, ζ successes will occur with a probability at least 1−δ.
In the application of Lemma A.1, the event of a coin landing heads corresponds to the
success event after following the robo-advisor’s policy for τ steps. However, the max-
imum number of successes that will occur throughout the execution of the algorithm
is bounded by
∑
sC(s) and hence ζ ≤
∑
sC(s). Therefore, by the union bound, with
a probability at least 1 − 2δ the robo-advisor will execute an ǫ-optimal policy on all
but O
(
τ2rmax
∑
s
C(s)
ǫ ln
1
δ
)
time steps.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Fix a state s ∈ S. Denote by θˆ
(n)
s the risk-aversion estimator after
observing the investor’s action n times in state s. Let N = 1 + 4σ
2
s
δξ2 . We have
P(|θs − θˆ
(N)
s | < ξ/2) ≥ 1−
4σ2s
Nξ2
≥ 1− δ.
where the first line follows by Chebyshev’s inequality and the second by the fact N =
1 + 4σ
2
s
δξ2
> 4σ
2
s
δξ2
. In other words, with a probability of at least 1 − δ, we have θs =
argminx∈Θ |x− θˆ
(N)
s |.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Fix a state s ∈ S. Denote by θˆ
(n)
s the risk-aversion estimator after
observing the investor’s action n times in state s. Let N = 2Rsξ2 ln
2
δ . We have
P(|θs − θˆ
(N)
s | < ξ/2) > 1− 2 exp(−
Nξ2
2R2s
)
= 1− δ.
where the first line follows from Hoeffding’s inequality and the second by choosing N =
2Rs
ξ2
ln 2δ . In other words, with a probability of at least 1−δ, we have θs = argminx∈Θ |x−
θˆ
(N)
s |.
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B Incremental formula
In this section, we present the detailed derivation of the incremental formula given in
Section 4.1.
θˆ(n)s =
1
n
n∑
i=1
g−1(aIi,s; s)
=
1
n
(
g−1(aIn,s; s) +
n−1∑
i=1
g−1(aHi,s; s)
)
=
1
n
(
g−1(aIn,s; s) + (n− 1)
1
n − 1
n−1∑
i=1
g−1(aIi,s; s)
)
=
1
n
(
g−1(aIn,s; s) + (n− 1)θˆ
(n−1)
s
)
=
1
n
(
g−1(aIn,s; s) + nθˆ
(n−1)
s − θˆ
(n−1)
s
)
= θˆ(n−1)s +
1
n
(
g−1(aIn,s; s)− θˆ
(n−1)
s
)
C The Infinite-Horizon Case
In this section, we extend our results to the case where T =∞ and introduce a discount
factor γ < 1. Let rπθ (t) be the (random) reward received by a type θ investor at time t
given that the robo-advisor policy is π. Let V π(st, θ) := E
(∑∞
j=1 γ
j−1rπθ (j)
)
denote the
discounted, infinite-horizon value function corresponding to a policy π, starting from
state st and given that the risk aversion parameter of the investor is θ. If T is a positive
integer, let V πT (st, θ) := E
(∑T
j=1 γ
j−1rπθ (j)
)
denote the T -step value corresponding to
policy π, when the market starts from state st and the risk aversion parameter of the
investor is θ. If π is non-stationary, then st is replaced by the partial path ht in the
previous definitions. We then have the following extension of Lemma 4.1.
Lemma C.1. Let Pt denote the policy followed by Algorithm 1 at time t, st be the
economic state at t, and set C(s) = f
(
s, δ|S|
)
. Let θ be the true risk aversion parameter of
the investor, Kt the set of states with accurately estimated risk preferences, and A(Kt, st)
be the event that a state s /∈ Kt is visited in the following T steps if the market starts in
state st ∈ K. Then, with probability at least 1− δ,
V PtT (ht, θ) ≥ V
∗
T (st, θ)−
2rmaxP(A(Kt, st))
1− γ
where |r(·)| ≤ rmax and Pt is the policy followed by Algorithm 1 at time t.
Proof. Replacing τ with T , and proceeding as in the proof of Lemma 4.1, we get
V PtT (ht, θ) ≥ V
∗
T (st, θ)− 2rmaxP(A(Kt, st))
T∑
j=1
γt−1
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≥ V ∗T (st, θ)−
2rmaxP(A(Kt, st))
1− γ
where the last inequality follows from the fact that
∑T
j=1 γ
j−1 = 1−γ
T
1−γ <
1
1−γ for γ <
1.
Next, we prove the extension of Theorem 4.1 to the infinite horizon discounted case.
Theorem C.1. Let Pt denote the policy followed by Algorithm 1 at time t, st be the
economic state at t, and set C(s) = f
(
s, δ|S|
)
. Let θ be the true investor type. Then
with probability at least 1− 2δ,
V Pt(ht, θ) ≥ V
∗(st, θ)− 3ǫ
— i.e., the algorithm is 3ǫ-close to the true optimal policy — for all but
m = O
(
rmax
∑
sC(s)
ǫ(1− γ)2
ln
1
δ
ln
rmax
ǫ(1− γ)
)
time steps.
Proof. Let T = 11−γ ln
rmax
ǫ(1−γ) . It follows from Lemma 2 of Kearns and Singh (2002) that
|V πT (st, θ)−V
π(st, θ)| ≤ ǫ for any state st and policy π. The previous inequality also holds
for non-stationary policies. Let Kt be the set of states with accurately estimated risk
preferences at time t. First, suppose that P(A(Kt, st)) ≤
ǫ(1−γ)
2rmax
. Then, with probability
at least 1− δ,
V Pt(ht, θ) ≥ V
Pt
T (ht, θ)− ǫ
≥ V ∗T (st, θ)−
2rmaxP(A(Kt, st))
1− γ
− ǫ
≥ V ∗T (st, θ)− 2ǫ
≥ V ∗(st, θ)− 3ǫ,
where the first and last inequalities follow from the above definition of T , the second in-
equality by Lemma C.1, and the third inequality by the assumption P(A(Kt, st)) ≤
ǫ(1−γ)
2rmax
.
Next, suppose that P(A(Kt, st)) >
ǫ(1−γ)
2rmax
, which implies that the robo-advisor imple-
menting Pt will either follow the optimal policy for the next T time steps, or encounter
a state s 6∈ Kt with probability at least
ǫ(1−γ)
2rmax
. We call the event that the robo-advisor
encounters s 6∈ Kt a “success”. Then, by Lemma A.1, after O(
Tζrmax
ǫ(1−γ) ln(1/δ)) time steps,
where P(A(Kt, st)) >
ǫ(1−γ)
2rmax
, ζ successes will occur with a probability at least 1 − δ.
In the application of Lemma A.1, the event of a coin landing heads corresponds to the
success event after following the robo-advisor’s policy for T steps. However, the max-
imum number of successes that will occur throughout the execution of the algorithm
is bounded by
∑
sC(s) and hence ζ ≤
∑
sC(s). Therefore, by the union bound, with
a probability at least 1 − 2δ the robo-advisor will execute an 3ǫ-optimal policy on all
but O
(
Trmax
∑
s
C(s)
ǫ(1−γ) ln
1
δ
)
= O
(
rmax
∑
s
C(s)
ǫ(1−γ)2 ln
1
δ ln
rmax
ǫ(1−γ)
)
time steps.
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D Resolution Parameter
In this section, we study how different values of the grid resolution parameter ξ affect
the rewards. We assume that the true investor’s risk-aversion parameter is uniformly
sampled from the interval [2.2, 8.3], as discussed in the model calibration Section 5.1.
Figure 5 shows, consistently with intuition, that as the resolution parameter decreases,
the rewards improve. When the resolution parameter is small, the robo-advisor is able
to estimate the true risk aversion parameter more accurately, and hence can make more
customized portfolio choices. The figure shows that the benefits obtained from reducing
the resolution parameter below ξ = 0.1 are insignificant.
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Figure 5: Yearly reward versus time, averaged over 104 trials. The range of mis-
takes r = 3, the sample complexity C = 5, the intervention cost κ = 0.08%, and the total
learning period is 10 years (i.e., 120 months). Reducing the resolution parameter ξ im-
proves the estimate of the risk aversion parameter θ and hence enables the robo-advisor
to make more tailored investment decisions, improving investor rewards. The value of
reducing the resolution parameter below ξ = 0.1 is minuscule.
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